Still Standing, Barely: Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami and the Impact on Fair Lending Litigation by Hoffberger, Trevor C,
Maryland Law Review
Volume 78 | Issue 4 Article 9
Still Standing, Barely: Bank of America Corp. v. City
of Miami and the Impact on Fair Lending Litigation
Trevor C, Hoffberger
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Banking and Finance Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate
Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
78 Md. L. Rev 967 (2019)
  
967 
Comment 
STILL STANDING, BARELY:  
BANK OF AMERICA CORP. V. CITY OF MIAMI  
AND THE IMPACT ON FAIR LENDING LITIGATION 
TREVOR C. HOFFBERGER∗ 
In the mid-1990s, changes in the mortgage lending market created new 
and harmful disparities for minorities in the United States.1  While access to 
mortgages increased in the 1990s, both the secondary mortgage market and 
the use of automated credit scoring set the stage for discriminatory and un-
favorable loan terms.2  The development of the subprime mortgage mar-
ket—involving higher costs and riskier terms for borrowers—enabled fi-
nancial institutions to issue mortgages “without regard to the borrower’s 
ability to afford them.”3  These practices disproportionately affected mi-
nority communities; black and Hispanic borrowers were more than twice as 
likely to obtain a subprime loan than were non-Hispanic white borrowers.4  
Consequently, these borrowers were significantly more likely to face mort-
gage foreclosure.5  In late 2009, subprime loans were past due at three times 
the rate of the national average of all mortgages, and lenders commenced 
foreclosure at over double the rate.6  Foreclosure rates in neighborhoods of 
major American cities skyrocketed, creating costs not only for the cities’ 
residents, but for the cities themselves.7 
                                                          
© 2019 Trevor C. Hoffberger. 
∗ J.D. Candidate, 2020, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law.  The au-
thor wishes to thank his Maryland Law Review editors for their guidance and feedback during the 
writing process.  The author also thanks Professors Susan Hankin and Barbara Bezdek for foster-
ing an appreciation for legal writing and housing law, respectively.  Finally, the author is grateful 
for the love, positivity, and encouragement of his family and friends in Baltimore and beyond.  
 1.  ALEX F. SCHWARTZ, HOUSING POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 351–58 (3d ed. 2015). 
 2.  Id. at 351–52. 
 3.  Id. at 352. 
 4.  Id. at 354.  One study indicates that even when “controlling for income, credit score, loan 
to value and property locations, borrowers of color were about 30 percent more likely to receive 
higher cost loans than similarly risky White borrowers.”  Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & 
URBAN DEV., FY 2010 BUDGET: ROAD MAP FOR TRANSFORMATION 5 (2009), 
https://archives.hud.gov/budget/fy10/fy10budget.pdf). 
 5.  SCHWARTZ, supra note 1, at 357. 
 6.  Id. 
 7.  See id. (“To the extent that subprime mortgages are clustered in particular, often minority 
areas, disproportionately high rates of foreclosure can harm entire neighborhoods, contributing to 
property abandonment, diminished property values, and crime.”). 
 968 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 78:967 
In Baltimore City, unfair lending practices both capitalize on and ex-
acerbate the effects of historical housing discrimination.  Local and federal 
housing policy each have contributed to the racial and economic segrega-
tion of Baltimore’s neighborhoods.8  As early as 1911, Baltimore Mayor J. 
Barry Mahool imposed the nation’s first segregation ordinance; it prevented 
citizens from living, attending school, or observing religion on the same 
block as a person of a different race.9  When the United States Supreme 
Court declared such ordinances unconstitutional,10 Baltimore officials 
formed a Committee on Segregation to cultivate and encourage racially re-
strictive covenants in white neighborhoods.11  Meanwhile, national profes-
sional and government policies aggravated these discriminatory effects.  
The National Association of Real Estate’s 1924 Code of Ethics required a 
realtor to “never be instrumental in introducing into a neighborhood charac-
ter of property or occupancy, members of any race or nationality, or any in-
dividual whose presence will clearly be detrimental to property values in 
that neighborhood.”12  Baltimore neighborhoods also felt the effects of the 
Federal Housing Administration’s “redlining” practices.13  In an effort to 
promote homeownership by insuring private mortgages, the agency ranked 
neighborhoods on a map based on the risk of potential loans.14  In doing so, 
however, the agency ranked predominantly black neighborhoods lowest and 
colored them red.15  As a result, mortgage funds diverted away from black 
neighborhoods, significantly impeding homeownership.16 
Subprime mortgage lending, furthermore, constitutes “reverse redlin-
ing” wherein financial institutions target minority neighborhoods when is-
suing predatory and unfair mortgage loans, perpetuating racial and econom-
                                                          
 8.  See generally ANTERO PIETILA, NOT IN MY NEIGHBORHOOD: HOW BIGOTRY SHAPED A 
GREAT AMERICAN CITY (2010). 
 9.  Garrett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style: The Residential Segregation Ordinances of 
1910–1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289, 289 (1983).  
 10.  See Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (holding a similar Louisville ordinance un-
constitutional). 
 11.  Garrett Power, Meade v. Dennistone: The NAACP’s Test Case to “. . . Sue Jim Crowe out 
of Maryland with the Fourteenth Amendment,” 63 MD. L. REV. 773, 792 (2004) (“The Committee 
on Segregation undertook to encourage neighbors, government officials, and real estate agents to 
use restrictive covenants, peer pressure, harassment, and suasion to promote de facto segrega-
tion.”). 
 12.  CODE OF ETHICS art. 34 (1924) (NAT’L ASS’N OF REAL ESTATE BDS., revised 1928). 
 13.  See PIETILA, supra note 8, at 72. 
 14.  Id. 
 15.  See id. at 70–73 (describing redlining practices beginning with the Home Owners’ Loan 
Corporation through the Federal Housing Administration).   
 16.  See id. at 73 (“This encouraged further redlining by banks, insurance companies, and 
other businesses, thereby dooming older city neighborhoods to advancing decay, particularly if 
they were black or mixed race.”). 
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ic divides.17  In Baltimore, for example, Wells Fargo Bank issued high-cost 
loans to forty-three percent of its black customers in 2007, but only nine 
percent of white customers.18  The bank’s deceptive practices included 
steering minorities into subprime loans when they otherwise qualified for a 
prime loan.19  Such practices led to disproportionate foreclosure rates in 
Baltimore’s black neighborhoods, where foreclosures occurred at nearly 
three times the rate of white neighborhoods.20  Due to these foreclosures, 
black neighborhoods saw a drastic increase in vacant properties.21 
In areas where financial distress leaves properties vacant, municipal 
costs are particularly high.22  Basic vacant property foreclosures might cost 
a city over $400 in foreclosure inspections and proceedings.23  These costs, 
however, can multiply if the homeowner disappears before the foreclosure 
process is complete.24  Uncollected bills and taxes, property maintenance, 
and legal processes can bring municipal expenses to over $19,000 per prop-
erty.25  In expenses connected directly to foreclosure proceedings, vacant 
properties can create additional expenses and headaches for local govern-
ments.26  Vacant properties in Baltimore demand municipal expenses for 
inspection, blocking entrances, cutting grass, prosecuting code violations, 
and making structural repairs.27  Vacant buildings can cause surrounding 
property to decline in value,28 which means that the city collects decreased 
                                                          
 17.  Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages at 2, 
Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2018). 
 18.  Id. at 28.  High-cost loans are “loans with an interest rate that was at least three percent-
age points above a federally-established benchmark.”  Id.  
 19.  Id. at 23–26. 
 20.  Id. at 18.  The foreclosure rate in majority-white neighborhoods was 1.63% compared to 
4.82% in majority-black neighborhoods.  Id. 
 21.  Id. at 44–45 (“In majority African-American neighborhoods, 270 of the Wells Fargo 
foreclosure properties became vacant after Wells Fargo made the loan.”). 
 22.  WILLIAM C. APGAR & MARK DUDA, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRES. FOUND., COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE: THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF TODAY’S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE BOOM 12 (2005) (“In 
the simplest cases, the unit transfers smoothly from the borrower into the portfolio of the note-
holder or to a foreclosure investor. . . .  If the unit becomes vacant, however, the City’s foreclosure 
costs mount rapidly.”).  
 23.  Id.  
 24.  Id. at 14–15. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. at 15 (estimating that “abandoned properties damaged by fire” can cost a city nearly 
$35,000); NAT’L VACANT PROPERTIES CAMPAIGN, VACANT PROPERTIES: THE TRUE COSTS TO 
COMMUNITIES (2005). 
 27.  See Third Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief and Damages, su-
pra note 17, at 45. 
 28.  See NAT’L VACANT PROPERTIES CAMPAIGN, supra note 26, at 9 (noting that in Philadel-
phia, “houses within 150 feet of a vacant or abandoned property experienced a net loss of 
$7,627”). 
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tax revenue for nearby properties as well.29  Lower property values can lead 
to a “spiral of blight” that includes population loss, arson, and crime.30 
Given the limited capacity of individuals to hold lending institutions 
accountable for discriminatory practices, municipalities have attempted to 
take the wheel.  The outcome in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,31 though 
not a housing-related case, made it virtually impossible to bring a class ac-
tion suit for disparate impact.  In Dukes, 1.5 million female employees of 
Wal-Mart filed a class action suit, alleging that the corporation systemati-
cally discriminated against women while making wage and promotional de-
cisions.32  The Supreme Court held, however, that the class of plaintiffs 
failed to meet the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a)(2) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure; as a result, the class could not be certified 
and the merits of the case went unaddressed.33  The Court explained that 
absent “proof of a companywide discriminatory pay and promotion policy,” 
the class could not assert they had suffered a common injury.34 
Because of individuals’ limited capacity to challenge discriminatory 
lending practices through class action, cities have taken on a larger role in 
that battle.  The first major breakthrough occurred when the Mayor and City 
Council of Baltimore was granted standing under the Fair Housing Act35 
(“FHA” or “the Act”) against Wells Fargo.36  This procedural victory and 
ensuing settlement led to a host of additional municipal claims against lend-
ers.  Memphis37 and other cities followed Baltimore’s lead, and eventual 
plaintiffs included Atlanta,38 Los Angeles,39 Miami Gardens,40 and Cook 
County, Illinois.41 
                                                          
 29.  Id. 
 30.  Id. at 12 (describing the “cumulative impact of vacant property”); APGAR & DUDA, supra 
note 22, at 9 (“Complicating matters is the fact that nonprime foreclosures tend to cluster in ways 
that generate significant spillover effects as vacant properties become magnets for crime and other 
social ills.”). 
 31.  564 U.S. 338 (2011). 
 32.  Id. at 343 (“[Plaintiffs] allege that the company discriminated against them on the basis 
of their sex by denying them equal pay or promotions, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964.”). 
 33.  Id. at 359; FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (2018) (“One or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if: . . . there are questions of law or 
fact common to the class.”). 
 34.  Dukes, 564 U.S. at 359. 
 35.  42 U.S.C. §§3601–3619 (2012).  
 36.  Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62, 2011 WL 1557759, at *1 (D. 
Md. Apr. 22, 2018); see also infra notes 115–117 (describing Baltimore’s litigation and the dis-
trict court’s reasoning). 
 37.  City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo, No. 09-2857-STA, 2011 WL 1706756, at *1 (W.D. 
Tenn. May 4, 2011) (holding that the City both had standing and had stated an adequate disparate 
impact claim under the FHA). 
 38.  E.g., DeKalb Cty. v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., No. 1:12-CV-03640-ELR, 2015 WL 
8699229, at *1 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 17, 2015). 
 39.  City of L.A. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
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In 2017, the City of Miami became the first of these cities to reach the 
United States Supreme Court in a fair lending dispute.  Bank of America 
Corp. v. City of Miami42 asked the Court to decide (1) whether the City had 
standing to sue under the FHA, and (2) whether the City’s alleged injuries 
met proximate cause standards.43  While the Court did grant standing to the 
City, it disagreed with the lower court’s use of foreseeability alone when 
evaluating proximate cause.44  Section I.A of this Comment will describe 
the history of the FHA and its applicability to discriminatory lending.45  
Sections I.B and I.C will detail statutory standing and proximate cause 
standards, respectively, with a particular focus on FHA contexts.46  Section 
I.D will discuss the Court’s reasoning in the City of Miami,47 followed by 
analyses of each issue on remand in Sections II.A and II.B.48  Finally, in 
Section II.C, the Comment will conclude with the options facing municipal-
ities following the decision.49 
I.  BACKGROUND 
The issues raised in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami rest at the 
intersection of political initiatives, social concerns, and legal precedent.  
The City brought a statutory claim under the FHA, federal legislation that 
Section I.A explains.50  In order to have standing and advance to discovery, 
the City needed to adequately plead that the alleged violations—
discriminatory mortgage lending practices—fell within protections granted 
by the FHA.51  Section I.B provides historical perspective behind this issue, 
tracing the Supreme Court’s decisions on constitutional, prudential, and 
statutory standing.52  Furthermore, Section I.C outlines case law surround-
ing proximate cause.53  While the Supreme Court has repeatedly used fore-
seeability and directness as benchmarks for pleading causation, lower courts 
                                                          
 40.  E.g., City of Miami Gardens v. Wells Fargo, 328 F. Supp. 3d 1369 (S.D. Fla. 2018). 
 41.  Cty. of Cook v. Bank of Am. Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 513 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Cty. of Cook v. 
HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 136 F. Supp. 3d 952 (N.D. Ill. 2015); Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo 
& Co., 115 F. Supp. 3d 909 (N.D. Ill. 2015). 
 42.  137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
 43.  Id. at 1301. 
 44.  Id. 
 45.  See infra Section I.A. 
 46.  See infra Sections I.B (statutory standing), I.C (proximate cause). 
 47.  See infra Section I.D. 
 48.  See infra Sections II.A (analyzing the Court’s ruling on standing), II.B (analyzing the 
Court’s ruling on proximate cause). 
 49.  See infra Section II.C. 
 50.  See infra Section I.A. 
 51.  See infra Section I.B.  
 52.  See infra Sections I.B.1 (Article III standing), I.B.2 (prudential requirements), I.B.3 (stat-
utory standing). 
 53.  See infra Section I.C. 
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have not been clear on how these standards apply to fair housing disputes.54  
Finally, Section I.D summarizes the Court’s majority and dissenting opin-
ions in City of Miami.55 
A.  FHA and Discriminatory Mortgage Lending 
In 1968, Congress passed the FHA, codified as Title VIII of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1968.56  While Congress failed to agree on the bill’s language 
for two years, President Lyndon B. Johnson was able to move the FHA 
through Congress following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. 
in April 1968.57  In addition to Dr. King’s influence on fair housing legisla-
tion prior to his death,58 the FHA was motivated by the ongoing housing 
discrimination against minority infantrymen returning from Vietnam.59  The 
Act’s legislative purpose was to “provide, within constitutional limitations, 
for fair housing throughout the United States.”60  Additionally, the legisla-
tive hearings for the FHA indicate that Congress intended to protect not on-
ly the direct victims of racial discrimination, but also “those who were not 
the direct objects of discrimination [who] had an interest in ensuring fair 
housing, as they too suffered.”61 
The FHA prohibits housing discrimination on the basis of “race, color, 
religion, sex, familial status, or national origin.”62  Protections under the 
FHA extend to the sale, rental, and advertising of homes; the Act also pro-
hibits inducing a buyer or renter based on the prospective entry of a particu-
lar group to a neighborhood.63  Regarding mortgage lending, the FHA has 
provided a basis for claims against unfair lending practices through its pro-
hibitions against discriminatory real estate transactions.64  The Act defines 
                                                          
 54.  See infra Sections I.C.1 (Supreme Court on proximate cause), I.C.2 (lower court applica-
tions). 
 55.  See infra Section I.D. 
 56.  42 U.S.C § 3601–3619 (2012). 
 57.  See History of Fair Housing, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/aboutfheo/history (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2018). 
 58.  Id. (“Since the 1966 open housing marches in Chicago, Dr. King’s name had been closely 
associated with the fair housing legislation.  President Johnson viewed the Act as a fitting memo-
rial to the man’s life work, and wished to have the Act passed prior to Dr. King’s funeral in Atlan-
ta.”). 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  42 U.S.C. § 3601. 
 61.  Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (citing Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 1358, S. 
2114, and S. 2280, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)).  
 62.  42 U.S.C. § 3604(b). 
 63.  Id. § 3604(e). 
 64.  Id. § 3605(a) (“It shall be unlawful for any person or other entity . . . to discriminate 
against any person in making available [a residential real estate] transaction, or in the terms or 
conditions of such a transaction, because of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status, or 
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transactions as “[t]he making or purchasing of loans or providing other fi-
nancial assistance” for the purchase or security of residential real estate.65  
Accordingly, courts have permitted municipal and county governments to 
submit claims against financial institutions for unfair mortgage lending 
practices.66 
B.  Courts Typically Grant Standing Broadly Under the FHA 
A plaintiff’s claim under the FHA must meet the requirements set by 
both Article III of the Constitution and those set by the judiciary’s pruden-
tial considerations.67  While Article III limits the Court’s jurisdiction to 
“cases” or “controversies,”68 the Court imposes additional, prudential re-
quirements to “avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no 
individual rights would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal 
courts to those litigants best suited to assert a particular claim.”69  This Sec-
tion examines the Supreme Court’s approach to standing in housing con-
texts. 
1.  Injuries from FHA Violations Meet Article III Standing 
Requirements 
Constitutional standing under Article III limits claims to actual “cases” 
or “controversies.”70  A case or controversy requires that (1) the plaintiff 
suffered an injury in fact; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s 
conduct; and (3) the injury will likely be redressed by the requested relief.71  
Furthermore, while “it does not suffice if the injury complained of is ‘th[e] 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court,’ 
                                                          
national origin.”); see also File a Complaint, U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., 
https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/fair_housing_equal_opp/online-complaint (last visited 
Sept. 15, 2018).  
 65.  42 U.S.C. § 3605(b). 
 66.  See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017) (holding that a city has 
standing to sue a bank for discriminatory mortgage lending under the FHA); City of L.A. v. Wells 
Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (permitting the municipality to recover under 
the FHA for discriminatory lending practices); Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 
3d 975 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (holding that the County was entitled to redress for certain damages result-
ing from the bank’s discriminatory mortgage lending); Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings 
Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (same); Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 
JFM-08-62, 2011 WL 1557759, at *1 (D. Md. Apr. 22, 2018) (denying the financial institution’s 
motion to dismiss the City’s FHA claim for discriminatory lending). 
 67.  Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979) (“This [standing] in-
quiry involves both constitutional limitations on federal-court jurisdiction and prudential limita-
tions on its exercise . . . .”). 
 68.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 69.  Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 99–100. 
 70.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 71.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). 
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that does not exclude injury produced by determinative or coercive effect 
upon the action of someone else.”72 
In Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood,73 the Supreme Court 
was asked to determine whether a group of plaintiffs—a village, four white 
residents, a black resident, and a black resident of a neighboring municipali-
ty—had Article III standing.  The plaintiffs sued a group of realtors under 
the FHA for “racial steering” practices.74  Namely, the realtors allegedly 
steered potential black buyers to an integrated neighborhood and potential 
white buyers away from the same area.75  The plaintiffs’ claimed injuries 
consisted of detrimental economic manipulations of their neighborhoods 
and the lost “benefits of living in an integrated society.”76  The Supreme 
Court held that the Village of Bellwood satisfied Article III standing be-
cause it may have endured both a “significant reduction in property values” 
and racial stability as a result of the defendants’ practices.77 
2.  The Court Typically Interprets Prudential Standing Broadly 
Under the FHA 
In addition to constitutional standing, a plaintiff alleging a FHA viola-
tion must also meet prudential standing requirements.78  Prudential standing 
requirements ensure that courts are not burdened with adjudicating a “‘gen-
eralized grievance’ shared in substantially equal measure by all or a large 
class of citizens.”79  Where the Court is particularly concerned with a plain-
tiff’s ability to sue under a statute, however, it asks whether the plaintiff’s 
asserted rights fall within the “zone of interests” that the statute intends to 
protect.80  As early as 1970, the Supreme Court in Ass’n of Data Processing 
Service Organizations v. Camp81 referenced a “trend toward the enlarge-
ment of the class of people” who fall within the zone of interests of a given 
statute.82 
                                                          
 72.  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 169 (1997) (alterations in original) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at 560–61). 
 73.  441 U.S. 91 (1979). 
 74.  Id. at 97. 
 75.  Id. at 95. 
 76.  Id. 
 77.  Id. at 110. 
 78.  Id. at 99–100 (“Even when a case falls within these constitutional boundaries, a plaintiff 
may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the judiciary seeks to avoid decid-
ing questions of broad social import where no individual would be vindicated . . . .”). 
 79.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975) (quoting United States v. Richardson, 418 
U.S. 166, 176 (1974)). 
 80.  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
 81.  397 U.S. 150 (1970). 
 82.  Id. at 154. 
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Specific to the FHA, a plaintiff must qualify as an “aggrieved person” 
who the statute intended to protect.83  The Act defines an aggrieved person 
as a person who either “claims to have been injured by a discriminatory 
housing practice” or believes that an injury “is about to occur.”84  The Su-
preme Court, furthermore, has interpreted the term “person” broadly in 
standing contexts; the term has previously encompassed localities,85 non-
profit agencies,86 and spouses of discriminated people.87 
In the 1972 case Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.,88 the 
Court recognized that the FHA afforded protections not only to direct recip-
ients of discrimination, but also to those who lost tangential benefits due to 
the violation.  In Trafficante, two tenants of an apartment complex—one 
white tenant and one black tenant—sued their landlord for racially discrim-
inatory practices against nonwhite renters.89  The plaintiffs’ injuries includ-
ed the lost benefits of living in an integrated community, lost business pro-
spects of having diverse neighbors, and social and economic damages of 
being stigmatized as living in a “white ghetto.”90  The Supreme Court first 
looked at the legislative history of the FHA, noting Senator Walter Mon-
dale’s hope that indirect victims would also be protected.91  Given this in-
tent to promote integrated communities, the Court construed the language 
broadly in order to “give[] standing to sue to all in the same housing unit 
who are injured by racial discrimination.”92  As a result, tenants of both rac-
es were granted statutory standing to sue under the FHA.93 
In 1982, the Court was asked to determine whether a nonprofit organi-
zation and two individually discriminated “testers” had standing to sue un-
                                                          
 83.  42 U.S.C. § 3610(a) (2012) (“An aggrieved person may . . . file a complaint with the Sec-
retary alleging [a] discriminatory housing practice.”). 
 84.  Id. § 3602(i). 
 85.  See Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 94–95 (1979) (permitting 
standing to a village, white residents, and a black resident in a “racial ‘steering’” claim that result-
ed in lost opportunity to in an integrated society); Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 165–66 (1997) 
(granting standing to an irrigation district as “any person” under the Endangered Species Act). 
 86.  See Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363 (1982) (allowing a nonprofit housing 
organization to state an FHA claim for decreased ability to provide services to prospective home-
buyers and increased expenses of combatting segregation). 
 87.  Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP 562 U.S. 170 (2011) (permitting a husband’s Title VII 
retaliation claim against his employer after he was fired following his wife’s gender discrimina-
tion complaint).  
 88.  409 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 89.  Id. at 207–08 (“The complaint alleged that the owner had discriminated against nonwhite 
rental applicants in numerous ways, e.g., making it known to them that they would not be wel-
come at Parkmerced, manipulating the waiting list for apartments, delaying action on their appli-
cations, [and] using discriminatory acceptance standards.”). 
 90.  Id. at 208. 
 91.  See supra note 61 and accompanying text. 
 92.  Trafficante, 409 U.S. at 212.  
 93.  Id. 
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der the FHA in Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.94  In this case, the non-
profit hired two “tester plaintiffs”—one white individual and one black in-
dividual—to pose as interested renters of apartment units.95  After the test-
ers were given different information regarding the availability of apartment 
units, the parties sued for discriminatory housing practices.96  The nonprof-
it’s alleged injuries included a decreased ability to provide counseling and 
referral services to its members “with a consequent drain on resources.”97  
The Court looked to the similar facts in Gladstone,98 where standing had 
been granted “to the full limits of Art[icle] III.”99  The nonprofit in Havens 
was forced to devote significant resources to counteracting FHA violations, 
which in turn decreased its capacity to provide its typical client services.100  
As a result, the Supreme Court gave the plaintiffs standing under the Act.101 
3.  Statutory Standing Analyses Outside of the Housing Context 
Help Inform the Reach of the FHA 
In addition to FHA claims, the Supreme Court has been asked to as-
sess statutory standing for persons aggrieved under other federal statutes.102  
While these cases do not address fair lending violations, they inform the ex-
tent to which certain “persons” may fall within a statute’s zone of inter-
ests.103  In Bennett v. Spear,104 for example, irrigation districts and ranch 
operators sued the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Endangered Species 
Act (“ESA”).105  The plaintiffs claimed that the agency’s mandate for min-
imum water levels failed to consider the economic interests of the affected 
region, in violation of the statute.106  While the United States District Court 
for the District of Oregon and the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit dismissed the case for lack of standing, the Supreme Court 
                                                          
 94.  455 U.S. 363 (1982).  
 95.  Id. at 368.  
 96.  Id. 
 97.  Id. at 369.  The organization also asserted association standing on behalf of its members 
who “had been deprived of the benefits of interracial association arising from living in an integrat-
ed community free of housing discrimination.”  Id. 
 98.  See supra notes 73–77 and accompanying text. 
 99.  Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n.9 (1979). 
 100.  Havens, 455 U.S. at 379 (“Such concrete and demonstrable injury to the organization’s 
activities—with the consequent drain on the organization’s resources—constitutes far more than 
simply a setback to the organization’s abstract social interests.”).  The “tester” plaintiffs were 
asked to amend their complaint in order to plead injuries with more particularity.  Id. at 377–78. 
 101.  Id. at 382. 
 102.  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170 
(2011). 
 103.  See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1303 (2017) (citing Bennett 
and Thompson as precedent for statutory standing analyses). 
 104.  520 U.S. 154 (1997). 
 105.  Id. at 159–60. 
 106.  Id. at 160. 
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reversed.  Applying the zone of interests test,107 the Court unanimously held 
that the irrigation district and ranchers qualified as “any person” under the 
ESA due to the purpose of the legislation (environmental protection for all) 
and the purpose of the particular provision (enforcement by private attor-
neys general).108 
Finally, in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP,109 the Court as-
sessed whether a husband’s retaliation claim fell within Title VII’s zone of 
interests when he had been fired after his wife filed a discrimination com-
plaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.110  Although 
the plaintiff in this case was not alleging retaliation against the person who 
had complained—his wife—the Supreme Court granted standing for his Ti-
tle VII claim.  The Court looked to the statutory language, specifically that 
an action for retaliation may be brought by “a person claiming to be ag-
grieved.”111  Recalling its previous broad interpretation of “person ag-
grieved” in Trafficante,112 the Court in Thompson held that the husband’s 
injury fell within the zone of interests protected by Title VII because the 
employer intended to hurt the plaintiff’s wife by firing him.113 
4.  Lower Courts Have Attempted to Apply Standing Requirements 
to Fair Lending Cases 
Specific to discriminatory lending suits under the FHA, lower courts 
have attempted to incorporate Supreme Court precedent with both constitu-
tional and statutory standing.  In one of the first of such cases, Mayor of 
Baltimore v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,114 the City of Baltimore’s third 
amended complaint survived a motion to dismiss for lack of standing.  The 
United States District Court for the District of Maryland held that the City’s 
alleged injuries—increased municipal expenses and decreased tax reve-
nue—were “fairly traceable” to the banks’ alleged misconduct and, there-
                                                          
 107.  See supra text accompanying note 80 (explaining that the zone of interests tests asks 
whether the relevant statute intends to protect against the type of injury alleged). 
 108.  Bennett, 520 U.S. at 165. 
 109.  562 U.S. 170 (2011). 
 110.  Id. at 172–73. 
 111.  Id. at 173 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)). 
 112.  Id. at 176.  It is worth noting that the Court considered the broadest interpretation of 
“person” under Trafficante to be “ill-considered” dictum.  Id. at 176.  The Court warned that ex-
panding standing to any person with Article III standing could lead to absurd results, such as a 
shareholder suing an employer for employment decisions that negatively impacted the company’s 
stock price.  Id. at 177. 
 113.  Id. at 178 (“Thompson is not an accidental victim of retaliation . . . .  Hurting him was the 
unlawful act by which the employer punished [his wife].  In those circumstances, we think 
Thompson well within the zone of interests sought to be protected by Title VII.”).  
 114.  Mayor of Balt. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. JFM-08-62, 2011 WL 1557759, at *1 (D. 
Md. Apr. 22, 2018). 
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fore, met the causation requirement of Article III standing.115  The court 
specified two allegations that “provide[d] the missing causal link” for 
standing: (1) the bank steered borrowers who would have qualified for 
prime loans into subprime loans, and (2) the bank approved minority bor-
rowers for refinance when they knew, or should have known, that such bor-
rowers would not be able to meet financial obligations.116  Many properties 
became vacant because the bank’s conduct forced borrowers to default.117  
Based on the causal connection between the City’s injuries and the defend-
ant’s actions, the court granted standing under Article III.118 
As the Supreme Court clarified its understanding of statutory stand-
ing,119 district courts needed to adjust accordingly.  In the Los Angeles case 
and in two of the three Cook County cases, the cities were granted both Ar-
ticle III and statutory standing, for their injuries fell within the protected 
zone of the FHA.120  In these cases, both the United States District Court for 
the Central District of California and the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois relied on the Havens proposition that “standing 
under the FHA [is] as broad as Article III standing.”121  Therefore, upon 
finding that the plaintiffs’ claims met constitutional standing requirements, 
these courts did not undergo a separate analysis for statutory standing.122 
                                                          
 115.  The court pointed to Gladstone for justification that, at the time of the opinion, standing 
under the FHA was “as broad as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.”  Id. at *2 (quoting 
Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 108 (1979)); see also supra note 71 and 
accompanying text (defining Article III standing requirements). 
 116.  Mayor of Balt., 2011 WL 1557759, at *3.  The causation analysis in Mayor of Baltimore 
is in the context of Article III standing; the court did not expressly mention proximate cause.  As 
stated in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., “Proximate causation is 
not a requirement of Article III standing, which requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly 
traceable to the defendant’s conduct.”  572 U.S. 118, 134 n.6 (2014). 
 117.  Mayor of Balt., 2011 WL 1557759, at *3. 
 118.  Id. at *6. 
 119.  See supra notes 80–113 and accompanying text (describing the development and applica-
tion of the zone of interests test). 
 120.  See City of L.A. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047, 1057 (C.D. Cal. 2014) 
(“Since the Court has already found that the City has adequately alleged Article III standing, the 
City’s alleged injuries fall within the FHA’s zone of interests.”); Cty. of Cook v. Bank of Am. 
Corp., 181 F. Supp. 3d 513, 520 (N.D. Ill 2015) (“In short, the County’s claims fall within the 
FHA’s zone of interests . . . .”); Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 136 F. Supp. 3d 
952, 959–64 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (holding that the County’s injuries of increased blight and decreased 
tax revenue fell within the FHA’s protected zone).  
 121.  City of L.A., 22 F. Supp. 3d at 1056; see also Cty. of Cook, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (“Con-
gress intended to confer standing to the full extent permitted under Article III of the Constitu-
tion.”); Cty. of Cook, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 963 (similar). 
 122.  See City of L.A., 22 F. Supp. 3d at 1057 (“Since the Court has already found that the City 
has adequately alleged Article III standing, the City’s alleged injuries fall within the FHA’s zone 
of interests.”); Cty. of Cook, 181 F. Supp. 3d at 519 (“I have already determined that the County’s 
complaint satisfies Article III’s standing requirements, so there is no need to undertake a separate 
zone of interests analysis.”); Cty. of Cook, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 964 (“[T]he County satisfies the re-
quirements of Article III standing as discussed above, and, consequently, falls within the zone of 
interests of the FHA.”).  
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Conversely, the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the third Cook 
County case for lack of statutory standing, holding that urban blight and de-
creased tax revenue do not fall within the FHA’s zone of interests.123  The 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida reached a 
similar conclusion in Miami’s trial court decision.124  In these latter cases, 
the district courts applied separate, more narrow analyses of statutory stand-
ing than for Article III standing.125  For example in County of Cook v. Wells 
Fargo & Co., the court relied on the assertion from Thompson that broad 
statutory standing in previous cases was “ill-considered” dictum.126  Ac-
cording the court, the FHA protects persons from facing discrimination 
while renting, buying, or mortgaging a home; Cook County took none of 
these actions.127  Under this narrow zone of interests analysis, Cook Coun-
ty’s claims were dismissed.128 
C.  The Supreme Court’s Proximate Cause Limits Have Led to 
Inconsistent Lower Court Decisions 
In addition to standing, municipalities must also demonstrate that their 
claimed damages were proximately caused by the financial institutions’ 
lending practices.129  Statutory claims such as those through the FHA must 
meet the same standard of proximate cause as common law tort claims.130  
At issue in discriminatory lending cases is the range of damages for which a 
                                                          
 123.  Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 115 F. Supp. 3d 909, 920 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (“Cook 
County’s own injuries—urban blight and a reduced property tax base—while perhaps conse-
quences of reverse redlining or equity stripping writ at large, do not bring it within [the FHA’s] 
zone of interests.”).  The discrepancy between this outcome and those in Cook County’s Bank of 
America and HSBC cases can likely be explained by differing views of the presiding judges.  For 
example, the HSBC decision acknowledges a “different view [within the district] . . . that Thomp-
son effectively overruled Gladstone in substance.”  Cty. of Cook, 136 F. Supp. 3d at 964. 
 124.  City of Miami v. Bank of Am. Corp., No. 13-24506-CIV, 2014 WL 3342348, at *2 (S.D. 
Fla., July 9, 2014).  On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit found 
that the City’s injuries fell within both Article III and statutory standing parameters.  City of Mi-
ami v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 U.S. 1296 (2017).  The 
bank appealed, and the ultimate Supreme Court decision is discussed in depth in Section I.D. of 
this Comment. 
 125.  See Cty. of Cook, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 915–20 (holding that the County was not an “ag-
grieved” person under the FHA); City of Miami, 2014 WL 3342348, at *3–4 (determining that 
Miami’s injuries fell outside the scope of the FHA). 
 126.  Cty. of Cook, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 915 (citing Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 
170 (2011)); see also supra note 112. 
 127.  See Cty. of Cook, 115 F. Supp. 3d at 919 (“Cook County . . . alleges neither that it was 
denied a loan nor offered unfavorable terms—setting aside the obvious point that Cook County is 
not alleged to have a race or other protected trait.”).  
 128.  Id. at 921. 
 129.  See Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305 (2017) (“The remaining 
question is one of causation: Did the Banks’ allegedly discriminatory lending practices proximate-
ly cause the City to lose property-tax revenue and spend more on municipal services?”). 
 130.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 132 (2014).  
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municipality might try to recover.  Municipalities may attempt to recover 
for, inter alia, municipal expenses related to foreclosure, decreased tax rev-
enue resulting from urban blight and decreased property values, and adverse 
impacts on racial integration.131 
1.  Proximate Cause in Both Statutory and Fair Housing Contexts 
Typically Require Foreseeability and Directness 
As stated by the Supreme Court in Holmes v. Securities Investor Pro-
tection Corp.,132 directness is a significant element, albeit not the sole fac-
tor, in determining proximate cause.133  While the Supreme Court has not 
defined which damages resulting from discriminatory lending meet the 
proximate cause requirement under the FHA, three cases may lend insight 
to the standard that municipalities must meet134: Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply 
Corp.;135 Hemi Group, LLC v. City of New York;136 and Lexmark Interna-
tional, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.137 
First, in Anza, Ideal Steel Supply Corporation (“Ideal”) sued a compet-
itor under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act138 
(“RICO”) for failing to charge customers sales tax and subsequently filing 
fraudulent tax returns to the State of New York.139  Ideal alleged that the de-
fendant’s failure to pay taxes allowed them to offer lower prices, which in-
jured the plaintiff in the form of decreased sales.140  The Supreme Court re-
jected this claim, noting that the plaintiff failed to meet the proximate cause 
requirement under the statute.141  According to the Court, (1) the injury re-
quires some direct relation to the conduct; (2) Ideal’s lost sales could have 
been caused by a multitude of other factors; and (3) another party—the 
State of New York—could better “vindicate the laws by pursuing their own 
claims.”142 
                                                          
 131.  See, e.g., Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 982 (N.D. Ill. 2018) 
(claiming costs incurred administering and processing foreclosures, lost property tax revenue, in-
creased demand for county services, urban crime and blight, and racial imbalance). 
 132.  503 U.S. 258 (1992). 
 133.  Id. at 269.  
 134.  See City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1306 (invoking common law principles of proximate 
cause as stated in Anza, Hemi, and Lexmark). 
 135.  547 U.S. 451 (2006). 
 136.  559 U.S. 1 (2010). 
 137.  572 U.S. 118 (2014). 
 138.  18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012).  The statute makes it illegal for people or entities asso-
ciated with interstate commerce “to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
[their] enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful 
debt.”  Id. § 1692(c).   
 139.  Anza, 547 U.S. at 454. 
 140.  Id.  
 141.  Id. at 457–60. 
 142.  Id. 
 2019] STILL STANDING, BARELY 981 
Second, Hemi illustrated the Court’s reliance on “directness” as a fac-
tor in proximate cause.143  New York City sued out-of-state cigarette sellers 
under RICO for failing to provide the State with required customer infor-
mation, which in turn prevented the State from sending such information to 
the City; as a result, the City was unable to track down certain customers 
for unpaid sales tax.144  The Court held that this claimed injury—lost sales 
tax revenue—was too remote to meet the proximate cause requirement of 
RICO.145  The defendant’s fraud was in fact committed against the State; 
furthermore, the City’s injury was more a product of the customers’ actions 
than those of the defendants.146  While noting that “[t]he concepts of direct 
relationship and foreseeability” contribute to common law proximate cause, 
the Court’s decision in Hemi illustrates that, at least as far as RICO claims 
are concerned, directness reigns supreme.147 
The third case that helps formulate the concept of statutory proximate 
cause is Lexmark.148  Lexmark, a manufacturer of printers and toner car-
tridges, used shrinkwrap language149 to encourage customers to return used 
cartridges to Lexmark in order to be refilled.150  Lexmark sued Static Con-
trol, a business that supplied “remanufacturers” with toner cartridge sup-
plies, including those originally sold by Lexmark; the remanufacturers 
would then refurbish and resell the cartridges.151  While the original suit in-
volved a copyright dispute, Static Control issued a cross-claim alleging that 
Lexmark violated the Lanham Act152 by (1) misleading customers to think 
that they were required to return the cartridges to Lexmark and (2) inform-
ing remanufacturers “that it was illegal to sell refurbished [Lexmark] car-
tridges.”153  When Lexmark attempted to dismiss Static Control’s cross-
claim on proximate cause grounds, the Supreme Court denied the motion.154  
In its decision, the Court noted that “the plaintiff’s injury flows directly 
                                                          
 143.  Hemi Group, LLC, 559 U.S. at 12. 
 144.  Id. at 5–6. 
 145.  Id. at 11 (“The City’s claim suffers from the same defect as the claim in Anza.”). 
 146.  Id.  Put in another way, “the defendant’s fraud on the third party (the State) has made it 
easier for a fourth party (the taxpayer) to cause harm to the plaintiff (the City).”  Id. (emphasis in 
original). 
 147.  Id. at 12. 
 148.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118 (2014).  
 149.  Shrinkwrap language in this context refers to “terms . . . communicated to consumers 
through notices printed on the toner-cartridge boxes, which advised the consumers that opening 
the box would indicate consent to the terms.”  Id. at 121. 
 150.  Id. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2012).  Static Control sued under § 1125(a)(1)(B), which provides a 
private right of action for any person who is “likely to be damaged” by false advertising.  
Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 122 (quoting § 1125(a)(1)(B)). 
 153.  Lexmark, 572 U.S. at 122–23.  
 154.  Id. at 140. 
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from the [remanufacturer’s] belief in the disparaging statements.”155  Addi-
tionally, since Static Control sold microchips that were only compatible 
with Lexmark’s cartridges, there was direct correlation between the reman-
ufacturer’s sales and Static Control’s sales.156  The extra step between the 
unlawful act and the alleged injury did not imply that the injury was too 
remote, for the Static Control’s injuries were just as immediate and predict-
able as those of the remanufacturers.157 
The Supreme Court has considered proximate cause as it relates to the 
FHA, albeit unrelated to mortgage lending practices.  In Texas Department 
of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, 
Inc.,158 the Inclusive Communities Project, a nonprofit affordable housing 
corporation, filed a disparate impact suit against the Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs for its unfair distribution of low income 
housing tax credits.159  The nonprofit alleged that the state agency granted 
“too many [tax] credits for housing in predominantly black inner-city areas 
and too few in predominantly white suburban neighborhoods.”160  As a re-
sult of these practices, racial and income segregation increased throughout 
the state.161  The Supreme Court affirmed the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision that the plaintiffs had a valid claim un-
der disparate impact theory.162  Importantly, the Court clarified that dispar-
ate impact claims under the FHA must meet a “robust causality 
requirement” such that racial imbalance alone cannot establish a prima facie 
case.163  Rather than relying on a statistical disparity alone, the Court re-
quired that the plaintiff must point to a specific policy or practice which 
caused the inequitable outcomes.164 
2.  Lower Courts Have Varied in Determining Which Effects of 
Discriminatory Lending Meet Proximate Cause Requirements 
Because the Supreme Court has not set concrete standards for proxi-
mate cause in discriminatory lending suits, lower courts have applied varied 
                                                          
 155.  Id. at 138. 
 156.  Id. at 139 (“[T]here is likely to be something very close to a 1:1 relationship between the 
number of refurbished [Lexmark] cartridges sold (or not sold) by the remanufacturers and the 
number of [Lexmark] microchips sold (or not sold) by Static Control.”). 
 157.  Id. at 140. 
 158.  135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 159.  Id. at 2514. 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. (“The ICP alleged the Department has caused continued segregated housing patterns 
by its disproportionate allocation of the tax credits . . . .”). 
 162.  Id. at 2525–26.  The Court asserted that disparate impact claims are cognizable under the 
FHA because “the FHA aims to ensure that [fair housing] priorities can be achieved without arbi-
trarily creating discriminatory effects or perpetuating segregation.”  Id. at 2522. 
 163.  Id. at 2523. 
 164.  Id. 
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approaches to the topic.  The United States District Court for the Central 
District of California assessed proximate cause in a discriminatory lending 
context in 2014, when the City of Los Angeles sued Wells Fargo for FHA 
violations.165  The City alleged that the unlawful practice resulted in lost 
property tax revenue and increased municipal services.166  The court applied 
a three-pronged test for proximate cause, examining (1) if there are more 
direct victims who might vindicate the law; (2) the difficulty in calculating 
the damages; and (3) if “the courts will have to adopt complicated rules ap-
portioning damages to obviate the risk of multiple recoveries.”167  Applying 
this test, the court in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co.168 held that 
the City’s damages met proximate cause requirement because they were 
distinct from those of the homebuyers, they could be calculated using a He-
donic regression analysis, and there was no danger of multiple recover-
ies.169 
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylva-
nia recently held that both economic and non-economic consequences of 
discriminatory lending violations meet the pleading requirements for prox-
imate cause.170  The City of Philadelphia filed suit against Wells Fargo in 
2017 for “reverse redlining” practices under which the bank offered less fa-
vorable and more risky loan terms to minority borrowers.171  The City al-
leged two types of damages: (1) economic injuries, such as increased mu-
nicipal expenses and decreased property tax revenue, and (2) non-economic 
injuries, including decreased capacity for minority homeownership and 
frustrated goals of integration.172  Denying the bank’s motion to dismiss, the 
court held that the non-economic injuries could plausibly have “some direct 
relation” to the banks’ alleged misconduct.173  The discriminatory practices 
both negatively impacted minorities’ ability to purchase homes and reduced 
overall minority homeownership.  While the court had “serious concerns” 
regarding the City’s ability to prove proximate cause for the economic inju-
ries, it permitted the claim to advance past the pleading stage.174 
Later in 2018, the United States District Court for the Northern District 
of Illinois decided three cases brought by Cook County, Illinois against fi-
                                                          
 165.  City of L.A. v. Wells Fargo & Co., 22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 166.  Id. at 1057. 
 167.  Id. (quoting Or. Laborers–Emp’rs Health & Welfare Tr. Fund v. Philip Morris, Inc., 185 
F.3d 957, 963 (9th Cir. 1999)). 
 168.  22 F. Supp. 3d 1047 (C.D. Cal. 2014). 
 169.  Id. at 1058. 
 170.  City of Phila. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-2203, 2018 WL 424451, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
16, 2018). 
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. at *6.  
 174.  Id.  
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nancial institutions under the FHA.175  The court evaluated proximate cause 
under a “directness” standard derived from Anza, Hemi, and Lexmark,176 
meaning that damages that went beyond the “first step of the causal chain” 
would not qualify for redress.177  As a result, the district court permitted the 
County to claim “direct” costs related to foreclosures, such as serving evic-
tion notices, conducting foreclosure proceedings, and inspecting foreclosed 
homes.178  In denying the defendant’s motion to dismiss, the court noted 
that (1) these costs flowed directly to the County, (2) no “better” plaintiff 
could sue for the costs, and (3) the exact amount of damages required a 
relatively simple calculation.179  On the other hand, the court granted the 
defendant’s motion to dismiss a number of other damages.180  For example, 
the County was not permitted to recover for the costs of social services to 
foreclosed homeowners, loss of property tax revenue from foreclosed and 
vacant properties, diminution of property values, diminished racial imbal-
ance, or urban blight.181  These types of costs could only be calculated 
speculatively and ran through too many links in the chain of causation.182 
D.  In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami, the Court Granted the 
City Standing Under the FHA but Dismissed the Claim on 
Proximate Cause Grounds 
In Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami,183 the City of Miami at-
tempted to recover from two banks—Wells Fargo and Bank of America—
for discriminatory lending practices under the FHA.  The City had sued the 
                                                          
 175.  Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Cty. 
of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975 (N.D. Ill. 2018); Cty. of Cook v. Bank of Am. 
Corp., No. 14 C 2280, 2018 WL 1561725 (N.D. Ill Mar. 30, 2018).   
 176.  See supra notes 138–157 and accompanying text. 
 177.  Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 984 (N.D. Ill. 2018).  The same 
court noted that this standard “obviates the difficulty in assessing damages from indirect injuries; 
avoids complicated rules for appropriating damages among several injured parties with greater or 
lesser injuries; and provides the requisite level of deterrence for . . . tortfeasors.” Cty. of Cook v. 
HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 960 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (alteration in original) 
(quoting RWB Servs., LLC v. Hartford Computer Grp., Inc., 539 F.3d 681, 688 (7th Cir. 2008)).  
 178.  See, e.g., Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 962 (N.D. 
Ill. 2018).  The County was also permitted to recover for lost recording and transfer fees due to the 
lender’s use of an electronic database in lieu of public reporting systems.  Id. at 965. 
 179.  Id. at 962; see also Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 984 (N.D. 
Ill. 2018) (“Those alleged harms, despite running through an ‘intervening link of injury’ to bor-
rowers, are ‘so integral an aspect of the violation alleged, there can be no question that proximate 
cause is satisfied.’” (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 
139 (2014))). 
 180.  See, e.g., Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 962–65 
(N.D. Ill. 2018) (rejecting the County’s claims for damages related to social services, decreased 
property tax revenue, racial imbalance, and urban blight). 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 988 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
 183.  137 S. Ct. 1296 (2017). 
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banks for “intentionally issu[ing] riskier mortgages on less favorable terms 
to African-American and Latino customers.”184  As a result, a dispropor-
tionate number of homes were foreclosed upon in nonwhite neighborhoods, 
resulting in widespread vacancies and increased segregation.185  This had an 
adverse impact on property values, which caused the City’s property tax 
revenue to decrease.186  Moreover, urban blight increased in those neigh-
borhoods, forcing the City to spend extra funds on municipal services.187  
The Court addressed two issues: (1) whether a municipality has standing 
under the FHA as an “aggrieved person”; and (2) whether the banks’ con-
duct proximately caused the injuries alleged by the City.188 
First, the Court held that the City was an “aggrieved person” under the 
FHA and had standing to sue the banks for the alleged conduct.  In addition 
to constitutional standing requirements of Article III, Section 2, Miami 
needed to show that it met the “‘statutory’ standing requirements” from 
Lexmark.189  The Court described how the term “aggrieved person” had 
been interpreted broadly in past cases; standing was typically defined “as 
broadly as is permitted by Article III.”190  Previous cases have allowed 
plaintiffs to sue under the FHA for being denied interracial relationships,191 
decreased tax revenues and impaired integration,192 and expenses related to 
combatting racial steering practices.193  Based on stare decisis, the Court 
held that the City’s injuries fell within the “zone of interests” protected by 
the FHA.194 
Second, the Court addressed whether the City’s alleged injuries were 
proximately caused by the banks’ conduct.195  The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the City met proximate cause be-
cause the injuries were “foreseeable results of the banks’ misconduct,” re-
gardless of the number of links in the causal chain.196  The Supreme Court 
                                                          
 184.  Id. at 1301. 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  See Third Amended Complaint for Violations of the Fair Housing Act at 28, City of Mi-
ami v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 13-cv-24508-DIMITROULEAS (S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2016) (relying 
on NAT’L VACANT PROPERTIES CAMPAIGN, supra note 26). 
 187.  City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1301.  
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 1302 (quoting Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 
118, 128 n.4 (2014)). 
 190.  Id. at 1303 (citing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)). 
 191.  See supra text accompanying note 76. 
 192.  See supra note 85. 
 193.  See supra note 86.  In Havens, the plaintiff’s complaint alleged “[the plaintiff organiza-
tion] had to devote significant resources to identify and counteract the defendant’s [sic] racially 
discriminatory steering practices.”  Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 379 (1982) 
(alteration in original). 
 194.  City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1305. 
 195.  Id at 1305–06. 
 196.  Id. at 1305.  
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disagreed, noting that the “directness” requirement of tort principles should 
control.197  As a result, the Court held that “foreseeability alone does not 
ensure the close connection that proximate cause requires.”198  The Su-
preme Court declined to set precise boundaries for proximate cause under 
the FHA, encouraging lower courts to create their own definitions.199  
Based on the above analysis, the Court vacated the Eleventh Circuit’s ruling 
and remanded for further proceedings based on the proximate cause discus-
sion.200 
Justice Thomas dissented in part and concurred in part; he agreed that 
the Eleventh Circuit erred in their proximate cause evaluation but argued 
that the City of Miami should not have had standing under the FHA to 
begin with.201  After reiterating the majority’s statutory standing require-
ments, Justice Thomas immediately diverged from the majority’s analy-
sis.202  He wrote that the broad interpretation of “aggrieved person” under 
older cases such as Trafficante and Gladstone had since been denounced by 
Thompson, in which the Court referred to the expanded interpretations as 
“ill-considered” dictum with “absurd consequences.”203  Furthermore, typi-
cal plaintiffs under the FHA include prospective homebuyers or neighbors 
who are negatively impacted by segregation; the FHA is silent on the issues 
on which Miami raised its complaint.204  Finally, the dissent raised concerns 
that expanded reading of FHA standing could lead to absurd results. 
Justice Thomas then agreed with the majority on the issue of proxi-
mate cause, specifically that it requires some direct relation rather than fore-
seeability alone.205  Justice Thomas went a step further, stating that he 
would have reversed the Eleventh Circuit’s decision rather than remand the 
                                                          
 197.  Id. at 1306.  The Court relied on the language from Holmes, requiring “some direct rela-
tionship between the injury asserted and the injurious conduct alleged.”  Id. (quoting Holmes v. 
Sec. Inv’r Prot. Corp., 503 U.S. 258, 268 (1992)). 
 198.  Id. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. 
 201.  Id. at 1306–12 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 202.  Id. at 1307. 
 203.  Id. at 1308 (quoting Thompson v. N. Am. Stainless, LP, 562 U.S. 170, 176 (2011)). 
 204.  Id. at 1309 (“But nothing in the text of the FHA suggests that Congress was concerned 
about decreased property values, foreclosures, and urban blight, much less about strains on munic-
ipal budgets that might follow.”).  Nor do the pleadings allege racial steering, which has been 
found to be within the FHA’s zone of interests.  See Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 
205, 208 (1972) (granting standing to a white tenant and a black tenant who alleged that a land-
lord’s discriminatory practices denied them the benefits of social integration); Gladstone, Realtors 
v. Vill. Of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 111 (1979) (permitting standing to plaintiffs alleging that racial 
steering practices prevented them from living in an integrated society).  Justice Thomas admitted 
that while Gladstone does address a “budget-related injury,” it must be considered “in addition to 
its racial- steering injury.”  City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1310 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 205.  City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1311. 
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case.206  He wrote that the circuit court would be in no better position than 
the Supreme Court in evaluating proximate cause, given that the case was 
brought up on a motion to dismiss, leaving only the complaint to evalu-
ate.207  Justice Thomas underscored that the complaint would not meet a 
reasonable proximate cause standard, re-stating the six step chain of events 
between the banks’ conduct and the alleged injuries.208 
II.  ANALYSIS 
The two holdings in Bank of America Corp. v. City of Miami create 
conflicting outcomes for cities in fair lending disputes.  On one hand, the 
Court reaffirmed its broad interpretation of standing under the FHA, provid-
ing an avenue for cities to litigate fair lending violations.209  Simultaneous-
ly, however, local governments may be discouraged to bring a claim in light 
of the Court’s “direct” proximate cause requirement.210  In demanding that 
cities show more than mere foreseeability of municipal damages, City of 
Miami aligns with Supreme Court precedent in curbing unwieldly litiga-
tion.211  Given the newly stated standard, subsequent lower court decisions 
have favored lending institutions.212  As a result, cities should explore alter-
native strategies in litigation, such as advanced data analytics, or policy, 
such as vacant property registration, in order to hold financial institutions 
accountable for discriminatory lending practices.213 
                                                          
 206.  Id. (“But these cases come to the Court on a motion to dismiss, and the Court of Appeals 
has no advantage over us in evaluating the complaint’s proximate-cause theory.”). 
 207.  Id.  
 208.  Id.  Justice Thomas wrote: 
As a result of the lenders’ discriminatory loan practices, borrowers from predominantly 
minority neighborhoods were likely to default on their home loans, leading to foreclo-
sures.  The foreclosures led to vacant houses.  The vacant houses, in turn, led to de-
creased property values for the surrounding homes.  Finally, those decreased property 
values resulted in homeowners paying lower property taxes to the city government.  Al-
so, . . . the foreclosed upon, vacant homes eventually led to “vagrancy, criminal activi-
ty, and threats to public health and safety,” which the city had to address through ex-
penditures of municipal resources. 
Id. (internal citations omitted) (quoting Brief for Respondent City of Miami at 6, City of Miami, 
137 S. Ct. 1296 (No. 15-1111)).  
 209.  See infra Section II.A. 
 210.  See infra Section II.B. 
 211.  See infra Section II.B. 
 212.  See infra Section II.C. 
 213.  See infra Section II.C. 
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A.  The Court’s Decision Reaffirms Its Broad Interpretation of 
Standing Under the FHA, Providing an Incentive for 
Municipalities to Use the Court Systems for Related Litigation 
The Supreme Court has made clear through a line of decisions that 
standing under the FHA should be granted liberally.214  While the Court had 
not yet heard a municipal plaintiff challenge an institution’s lending prac-
tices under the FHA, its decision properly aligns with the holdings in Traf-
ficante v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., Gladstone v. Village of Bell-
wood, and Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman.215  In both Gladstone and 
Trafficante, the plaintiffs included individuals who were not directly 
harmed but had nonetheless suffered an injury-in-fact under Article III of 
the Constitution.216  The plaintiffs lost the benefits of living an integrated 
society, and they suffered economic harm as a result of racial steering prac-
tices in their neighborhood.217  Moreover, one of the plaintiffs in Gladstone 
included a village, supporting the notion that a municipality’s injuries that 
derive from certain FHA violations fall within the zone of interests protect-
ed by the Act.218  In Havens, the Court granted standing to a housing non-
profit which was unable to serve its clients and, consequently, suffered fi-
nancially.219  These cases illustrate that the Court’s understanding of 
“aggrieved person” under the FHA has expanded to the fullest extent of Ar-
ticle III of the Constitution.220 
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of FHA standing, furthermore, is 
consistent with statutory standing holdings in recent decades.221  After the 
Court in Ass’n of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp au-
thorized an “enlargement” of the class of plaintiffs receiving under the zone 
of interests test, numerous cases reflected this thinking.222  For example, 
Bennett v. Spear illustrates how an entire district could have standing for a 
claim that a regulation, which was intended to affect ranchers, unfairly af-
                                                          
 214.  1 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTS § 3:17 (3d ed. 2014) (“In combina-
tion, Trafficante, Gladstone, and Havens create a generous standing doctrine under the [FHA], a 
doctrine that requires a finding of standing to the full extent permitted by Article III of the Consti-
tution.”).  
 215.  See supra notes 73–77, 88–101 and accompanying text. 
 216.  See supra notes 73–77, 88–93 and accompanying text.  
 217.  Trafficante, 409 U.S. 205 (considering business prospects of having diverse neighbors as 
economic harm); Gladstone, 441 U.S. 91 (permitting economic manipulation of the neighborhood 
and reduced property values as economic harm). 
 218.  See Gladstone, 441 U.S. at 110–11 (granting standing to the village based on economic 
manipulation of its neighborhoods).  
 219.  See Havens, 455 U.S. at 379. 
 220.  See supra note 83. 
 221.  See supra Section I.B.3.  
 222.  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970); see supra notes 
80–82 and accompanying text. 
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fected that region’s economy.223  The Court took a more nuanced approach 
in 2011 in Thompson v. North American Stainless, LP.224  Despite saying 
that it would not allow every party with Article III standing to sue under Ti-
tle VII, the Court granted standing to a husband claiming that his employer 
retaliated after his wife had filed a separate grievance.225  Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia explained that although the employer did not retali-
ate directly against the wife, her husband’s injury was still one which the 
Title VII legislation was intended to prevent.226 
The Court’s trend toward expanding standing in FHA cases support 
the majority’s ruling in City of Miami.  First, the holdings from Trafficante, 
Gladstone, and Havens indicate that an FHA plaintiff need not be the im-
mediate recipient of misconduct.227  Similarly, the City of Miami alleged 
injuries that resulted from misconduct directed at other individuals.228  Just 
as groups and regions were granted standing for injuries related to individu-
al statutory violations in Gladstone, Havens, and Bennett v. Spear, the City 
of Miami’s claim properly fell within the Court’s expanded reading of “ag-
grieved persons.”229  Furthermore, even if the Court decided to restrict its 
holding to signal a shift in statutory standing after Thompson, Miami’s 
claim would likely still pass muster.  When the Thompson Court referred to 
the expanded standing in previous cases as “ill-considered” dictum, it in-
tended to limit statutory standing to plaintiffs whose interests fell within the 
purposes of the legislation.230  Looking at the purposes of the FHA, the City 
of Miami’s injuries are likely the type which Congress intended to pre-
vent.231  The FHA was created to protect “those . . . [who] had an interest in 
ensuring fair housing,”232 and a municipality can demonstrate such an inter-
est.233 
                                                          
 223.  Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997); see supra notes 102–108 and accompanying text. 
 224.  See supra text accompanying notes 109–113. 
 225.  Id. at 178. 
 226.  Id.  
 227.  See supra text accompanying notes 214–220. 
 228.  Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1301–02 (2017).  The premise of 
the claim was that the bank’s predatory lending practice adversely impacted certain neighbor-
hoods, which placed both an economic and social burden on the City to address the damages.  Id. 
 229.  See supra text accompanying notes 73–77 (Gladstone), 94–100 (Havens), 102–108 (Ben-
nett). 
 230.  Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176–77 (2011).  It should be noted that the holding in Thompson, 
which sought to restrict statutory standing, addressed a Title VII claim.  Id.  Additionally, the 
Thompson Court’s concerns about Article III standing are reflected in Justice Thomas’s dissent in 
City of Miami.  See supra text accompanying notes 201–204. 
 231.  See supra notes 60–61.  
 232.  Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 210 (1972) (citing Hearings Before the 
Subcomm. on Hous. and Urban Affairs of the S. Comm. on Banking and Currency on S. 1358, S. 
2114, and S. 2280, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967)). 
 233.  See Veronica Nicholson, Note, Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami, 44 OHIO 
N.U. L. REV. 147, 169–70 (2018) (citing testimonies from City of Miami that illustrate a munici-
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In his City of Miami dissent, Justice Thomas echoed the concerns 
about expanded statutory standing originally raised in Thompson; however, 
these concerns are misplaced.  Both Justices Thomas and Scalia worried 
that broad grants of standing under statutes such as the FHA would lead to a 
litany of unnecessary and unfair litigation.234  Two factors suggest that mu-
nicipal standing will not lead to absurd results.  First, the “zone of interests” 
test limits the Court’s ability to adjudicate in statutory causes of action.  
This test, first created in Ass’n of Data Processing, ensures that the Court 
does not hear “generalized grievances”235 in statutory contexts.236  While 
Justice Thomas warns of local merchants and service providers bringing 
similar FHA claims on account of lost business,237 their interests do not fall 
within the zone of the FHA’s purpose because they do not have a clear in-
terest in fair housing.238  Second, the Court simultaneously set rigid re-
quirements for proximate cause.239  By stating that foreseeability alone is 
not sufficient to recover for injuries under the FHA, the Court effectively 
discouraged “foreseeable” yet indirect victims of foreclosures, such as local 
businesses, from bringing claims because their injuries were not proximate-
ly caused by the lenders’ misconduct.240 
                                                          
pality’s interest in fair housing); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2525–26 (2015) (“The Court acknowledges the 
[FHA’s] continuing role in moving the Nation toward a more integrated society.”). 
 234.  Thompson, 562 U.S. at 176–77 (“If any person injured in the Article III sense by a Title 
VII violation could sue, absurd consequences would follow.”); Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Mi-
ami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1310–11 (2017) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Petitioners similarly argue that, if 
Miami can sue for lost tax revenues under the FHA, then ‘plumbers, utility companies, or any oth-
er participant in the local economy could sue the Banks . . . .’” (quoting City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 
at 1304 (majority opinion))).   
 235.  Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
 236.  Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). 
 237.  City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1304 (raising the defendant’s concerns that “restaurants, 
plumbers, utility companies, or any other participant in the local economy could sue the Banks to 
recover business they lost when people had to give up their homes”).  
 238.  See supra text accompanying notes 56–61.  Miami raised this argument when arguing 
that municipal standing would not lead to absurd results.  See Jesse D.H. Snyder, No Need for Cit-
ies to Despair After Bank of America Corporation v. City of Miami: How Patent Law Can Assist 
in Proving Predatory Loans Directly Cause Municipal Blight Under the Fair Housing Act, 70 ME. 
L. REV. 63, 74 (2017) (“Only parties with an interest in fair housing—like cities—can sue under 
the FHA.” (alterations omitted) (quoting Amy Howe, Argument Preview: Justices to Consider 
Scope of Fair Housing Act, SCOTUSBLOG (Nov. 3, 2016, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2016/11/argument-preview-justices-to-consider-scope-of-fair-
housing-act/)). 
 239.  See supra text accompanying notes 196–200.  
 240.  See Nicholson, supra note 233, at 168 (“[B]y reeling in the standard for proximate cause 
under the FHA, the majority made sure that not just anyone who foreseeably experienced financial 
loss as a result of the banks’ alleged misconduct could sue under the FHA.”). 
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In addition, the Court’s decision reaffirms the role of cities in protect-
ing the rights of their citizenry, particularly in disparate impact contexts.241  
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, the Court held that, absent a discrimina-
tory policy, plaintiff classes cannot meet the “commonality” requirement of 
Rule 23(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.242  Thus, the Court 
“effectively eliminated private class actions against mortgage lenders based 
on alleged violations of the FHA.”243  Following that decision, municipali-
ties increasingly attempted to use the court system to litigate fair lending 
disputes.244  While Cleveland attempted to sue on nuisance theory, Balti-
more’s case was the first in which a city alleged detrimental harm as a result 
of banking practices.245  Baltimore, in addition to Memphis and Chicago—
who had brought fair lending claims on similar bases246—survived a signif-
icant motion to dismiss for lack of standing.247  As a result, these cities were 
able to reach “massive settlements negotiated by the U.S. Department of 
Justice” against major lending institutions.248  Lower courts subsequently 
favored municipalities bringing unfair lending cases in banks.  In a total of 
twelve cases brought by Atlanta, Los Angeles, Miami, and Cook County, 
ten plaintiffs were eventually granted standing.249  As one legal expert has 
noted, the decision to grant standing to Miami in the Supreme Court “af-
firmed progressive cities’ role in combatting housing segregation in the 
United States.”250 
                                                          
 241.  See John L. Ropiequet et al., Fair Lending Developments: Standing to Sue Takes the 
Floor, 72 BUS. L. 549, 549–54 (2017) (chronicling the rise in municipal plaintiffs following Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes).  
 242.  Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 359 (2011); see supra notes 31–34 and accom-
panying text (describing the Court’s analysis in Dukes); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(2) (“[T]here are 
questions of law or fact common to the class.”). 
 243.  See Ropiequet et al., supra note 241, at 550. 
 244.  Id. 
 245.  John L. Ropiequet, Has the US Supreme Court Sounded the Death Knell for Fair Lend-
ing Cases?, BANKING & FIN. SERVS. POL’Y REP., July 2017, at 6. 
 246.  See supra text accompanying notes 37–41. 
 247.  See supra text accompanying notes 114–117. 
 248.  Ropiequet, supra note 245, at 6. 
 249.  See Ropiequet, supra note 241, at 551.  Three of the four Miami cases were given stand-
ing on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit, and two of the three Cook County cases were granted stand-
ing in the district court.  Id. 
 250.  Mark Joseph Stern, Will Fair Housing Stay Fair?: The Supreme Court’s Ruling in Bank 
of America v. City of Miami Strengthened the Fair Housing Act—for Now, SLATE (May 1, 2017), 
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2017/05/in-bank-of-america-v-miami-the-supreme-court-
strengthens-the-fair-housing-act.html. 
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B.  The City of Miami Ruling that Proximate Cause Requires More 
than “Foreseeability” May Discourage Unfair Lending Litigation, 
but It Aligns with FHA Precedent 
The Court’s second holding in City of Miami—that proximate cause 
for damages in fair lending cases requires more than foreseeability 
alone251—is consistent with precedent in both the Supreme Court and dis-
trict courts.  The Supreme Court held that the Eleventh Circuit erred by us-
ing foreseeability to evaluate proximate cause; it instead required that the 
lower court use the “directness” standard from tort principles.252  The Court 
declined to provide further guidance on the issue for lower courts, intending 
for those courts to set the limits of proximate cause in light of both foresee-
ability and directness.253 
This more stringent proximate cause standard, in contrast with the 
aforementioned standing holding, may discourage cities from using court 
systems to recover for the municipal costs of discriminatory lending.  Many 
legal analysts have noted that the decision makes the standing win a “Pyr-
rhic victory” due to the more rigid causation requirements.254  While the 
path to standing might be more direct, “uncertainty in proving causation 
may lead cities to forego suing under the [FHA].”255  The decision, difficult 
as it may appear to cities, does align with causation precedent. 
First, the Supreme Court has held that in statutory causes of action, 
and particularly in FHA claims, causation requires more than foreseeability.  
The Court in both Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp. and Hemi Group, LLC 
v. City of New York indicated that, at least as far as statutory fraud cases are 
concerned, some direct relationship is required between the alleged miscon-
duct and ensuring harm.256  This standard both ensures that no intervening 
cause accounts for the harm and that the defendant’s harm is best remedied 
by the particular plaintiff.257  Furthermore, the Lexmark International, Inc. 
v. Static Control Components, Inc. decision indicates that if there are multi-
ple steps in the chain of causation, those steps should carry predictable and 
proportional harms.258  In a FHA context, the Court in Texas Department of 
Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. held 
                                                          
 251.  Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1305–06 (2017). 
 252.  See supra notes 195–200 (describing the Court’s analysis of proximate cause). 
 253.  City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. at 1306. 
 254.  Ropiequet, supra note 245, at 9; see also Snyder, supra note 238, at 78 (citing commen-
tary by legal experts who felt that the proximate cause holding gives cities a difficult standard to 
meet). 
 255.  Snyder, supra note 238, at 78 (citing Stern, supra note 250).  
 256.  Anza v. Ideal Steel Supply Corp., 547 U.S. 451, 461 (2006); Hemi Group, LLC v. City of 
New York, 559 U.S. 1, 11 (2010); see also supra text accompanying notes 138–147. 
 257.  See supra text accompanying notes 138–147. 
 258.  Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 140 (2014); see 
also supra text accompanying notes 156–157. 
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that while the FHA may be used to litigate disparate impact claims, plain-
tiffs must meet a “robust causality requirement.”259  Similar to the Wal-
Mart decision, this outcome indicates that plaintiffs must be able to trace 
damages directly to a particular policy or decision.260  The stringent causali-
ty standard would, therefore, ward off unnecessary litigation.261 
Similarly, by limiting fair lending claims to those with at least some 
direct relationship with the alleged misconduct, the Court signifies an intent 
to permit recovery only when an injury can be traced to the harm.262  The 
ruling in City of Miami both limits judicial abuse and simplifies damage 
calculations.  Additionally, the rule aligns with the precedent set through 
Anza, Hemi, and Lexmark, since the Court has clearly required that proxi-
mate cause for statutory causes of action requires at least some direct con-
nection.263  The Eleventh Circuit—the only court of appeals to rule on this 
issue—used a foreseeability standard when evaluating proximate cause.264  
In developing this standard, the Eleventh Circuit cited to Gladstone and 
Havens to show that direct harm need not be pleaded in order to bring an 
FHA claim.265  These cases, however, serve to determine standing under the 
FHA266 and should not be used to establish limits for proximate cause as it 
relates to disparate impact and fair lending. 
C.  After City of Miami, the Trends in Lower Courts’ Interpretation of 
Proximate Cause Favor the Lenders, Meaning Cities Might Explore 
Alternative Options to Hold Banks Accountable 
The City of Miami Court’s standing and proximate cause rulings argu-
ably “[give] ammunition to both sides in litigation between cities and banks 
under the [FHA] over the impact of predatory lending practices on local 
                                                          
 259.  Tex. Dep’t of Hous. and Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2507, 2523 (2015). 
 260.  See John L. Ropiequet, The Supreme Court Doubles Down on the Causation Require-
ment for Fair Lending Cases, 71 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 219, 219–20 (2017) (describing 
Dukes and Inclusive Communities as precursors to the City of Miami outcome). 
 261.  Inclusive Communities, 135 S. Ct. at 2512 (“These limitations are also necessary to pro-
tect defendants against abusive disparate-impact claims.”). 
 262.  See Ropiequet, supra note 260, at 236 (“Dukes, Inclusive Communities, and City of Mi-
ami . . . stressed the importance of evidence of a strong causal connection between the lenders’ 
acts and discriminatory effects on borrowers.”). 
 263.  See supra text accompanying notes 256–259.  
 264.  Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017) (“The Eleventh Cir-
cuit grounded its decision on the theory that proximate cause under the FHA is ‘based on foresee-
ability’ alone. . . .  [No] other court of appeals weighed in on this issue.” (quoting City of Miami 
v. Bank of Am. Corp., 800 F.3d 1262, 1282 (11th Cir. 2015), vacated, 137 U.S. 1296)). 
 265.  City of Miami, 800 F.3d at 1281. 
 266.  See supra Section II.B. 
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communities.”267  While the Court’s broad standing requirements might en-
courage a city to use litigation to settle disputes with financial institutions, 
the stringent causation standard might serve as a deterrent.268  Furthermore, 
municipalities will keep an eye on both settlement discussions and litigation 
in lower courts around the country.  While many cases prior to City of Mi-
ami focused on standing, lower courts will now be tasked to determine 
which sorts of injuries can be directly linked to the alleged misconduct.269 
Following the City of Miami decision, few courts have ruled on which 
municipal injuries might be proximately caused by discriminatory lend-
ing.270  The outcomes have favored financial institutions.  In all three Cook 
County cases, the district court concluded that most of the County’s alleged 
injuries did not meet the directness standard.271  In the suits against HSBC 
and Wells Fargo, for example, the court denied the motions to dismiss 
claims for expenses related to foreclosure proceedings, but dismissed 
claims related to lost tax revenue, increased blight, increased social ser-
vices, and the like.272  While the costs related to foreclosure proceedings 
were “within the first step of injury,” the vast majority of other claims “de-
pended on a multitude of factors”273 and required “difficulty in measuring 
and apportioning.”274 
Meanwhile, City of Philadelphia v. Wells Fargo & Co. might represent 
a beacon of hope for cities at the pleading stage, although lending institu-
tions might find comfort in the likely merits of the case.275  The Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania held that non-economic injuries, such as frustrated 
integration goals, could have a direct relationship to the bank’s lending 
practices because they may have impaired minorities’ ability to purchase 
                                                          
 267.  Tony Mauro, SCOTUS Decision May Fuel Suits Against Banks, LAW.COM, (May 21, 
2017) https://www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/05/01/scotus-decision-may-fuel-suits-against-
banks/.  
 268.  Id. 
 269.  See Ropiequet, supra note 245, at 9. 
 270.  Cty. of Cook v. Bank of Am. Corp., No 14 C 2280, 2018 WL 1561725, at *1 (N.D. Ill. 
Mar. 30, 2018); Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950 (N.D. Ill. 
2018); Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975 (N.D. Ill. 2018). 
 271.  See supra notes 178–182 and accompanying text. 
 272.  See supra notes 178–182 and accompanying text. 
 273.  Cty. of Cook v. HSBC N. Am. Holdings, Inc., 314 F. Supp. 3d 950, 962 (N.D. Ill. 2018).  
 274.  Id.; see also Cty. of Cook, 2018 WL 1561725, at *5 (holding that “both the contingent 
nature of the county’s injuries . . . as well as their temporal and causal remoteness” justify dismis-
sal); Cty. of Cook v. Wells Fargo & Co., 314 F. Supp. 3d 975, 990 (N.D. Ill. 2018) (noting that 
damage calculation would require “the very kind of ‘massive and complex damages litigation’ 
against which the Supreme Court has strongly cautioned” (quoting Bank of Am. Corp. v. City of 
Miami, 137 S. Ct. 1296, 1306 (2017))). 
 275.  City of Phila. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 17-2203, 2018 WL 424451, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
16, 2018); see supra text accompanying notes 170–174 (describing Philadelphia’s claim and the 
court’s holding). 
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homes.276  In reaching this decision, the district court opted not to rule on 
proximate cause for economic injuries such decreased tax revenue.277  The 
court did, however, caution that it had “serious concerns” regarding proxi-
mate cause for these injuries on the merits, which might further deter the 
use of litigation to resolve these disputes.278  Proximate cause for the ripple 
effects of discriminatory lending will likely be difficult to prove on the mer-
its in other pending cases around the nation.279 
Municipalities attempting to recover for foreclosure—and blight-
related damages from unfair lending—may need to examine alternative liti-
gation or policy-based solutions.  First, cities might explore innovative liti-
gation strategies to more closely connect their injuries to the discriminatory 
banking practices.  Data and expert analysis may be used to demonstrate a 
more predictable and close connection between lending practices and urban 
blight.280  As early as Baltimore City’s case against Wells Fargo, the City 
used Hedonic regression analyses to plead “precise quantification of the in-
jury to the City caused by Defendants’ discriminatory lending practices.”281  
While Baltimore only needed to show a fairly traceable relationship be-
tween the bank’s conduct and the City’s alleged injuries,282 similar calcula-
tions might be used for proximate cause pleadings. 
As the Supreme Court held, the presence of a one to one relationship 
between cause and result can mitigate concerns about extra “steps” in the 
causal chain.283  Techniques that eliminate intervening and contributing 
causes of blight, therefore, can benefit cities in meeting proximate cause 
standards.  As seen in City of Los Angeles v. Wells Fargo & Co., where the 
district court used a proximate cause standard rooted in both directness and 
foreseeability, advanced data can illustrate a connection between actions 
and results.284  Specifically, the court noted how “the City alleges that De-
fendants’ contribution can be parceled out from the losses attributable to 
non-Wells Fargo foreclosures and other causes through Hedonic regression 
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analysis.”285  Courts have increasingly permitted regression analyses to 
show damages, but they are subject to strict Daubert standards and can be 
excluded for even slightly unsupported assumptions.286  The combination of 
advanced economic statistics and expert witnesses might nevertheless get 
the issue of proximate cause to a jury.287 
If litigation ultimately proves fruitless in this regard, cities will need to 
explore policy options to hold lenders accountable for unfair lending prac-
tices.  For example, cities could force lenders to be accountable for vacant 
property upkeep through vacant property registration (“VPR”).288  This pro-
cess can require lenders to register a property at the time of foreclosure or 
after a property has been vacant for a term.289  Chula Vista, California, be-
came one of the first localities to enforce VPR on lending institutions.290  
Mandated by ordinance, lenders must inspect a home ten days after initial 
notice of foreclosure; and if the property is vacant, the lender “must then 
register with the city and is required to maintain the property to a specified 
community standard.”291  The city is subsequently able to collect taxes, im-
pose fines, and place priority liens on the property.292  Such a process, while 
not a comprehensive method to recover all foreclosure-related damages, 
might at least keep institutions accountable for blighted and nonpaying 
properties. 
III.  CONCLUSION 
Ever since Baltimore City survived a motion to dismiss for lack of 
standing in its fair lending litigation against Wells Fargo and Bank of 
America, lower courts have authored inconsistent decisions regarding mu-
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nicipal standing and proximate cause under the FHA.293  In Bank of Ameri-
ca Corp. v. City of Miami, the Supreme Court stated that while municipali-
ties have standing to sue banks for unfair lending practices under the FHA, 
mere foreseeability is insufficient to establish proximate cause.294  The 
Court properly stated that the historically broad reading of statutory stand-
ing under the FHA should include municipalities.295  Additionally, its man-
date that proximate cause include some element of directness aligns with 
precedent in both fair housing and similar statutory contexts.296  This deci-
sion may appear to benefit both sides in discriminatory lending litigation, 
but the stringent proximate cause standards might discourage cities from us-
ing the courts to settle similar disputes.297  Moving forward, municipalities 
may need to explore alternative litigation strategies or policy solutions to 
hold banks accountable for discriminatory lending practices.298 
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